former Prime Minister Koizumi’s rem

former Prime Minister Koizumi’s remarks at ceremonies in Tokyo marking the 60th
anniversary of the end of WW2 on August 15, 2005, were commendable, why
couldn’t a Japanese prime minister say the same thing in Beijing and perhaps visit
the Nanjing Massacre Memorial? For its part, China could accept such apologies and
lay the matter of apologies to rest once and for all. While not giving China or South
Korea veto power over its own textbooks, the Japanese government could ensure
that no textbooks will be approved that whitewash the darker side of Japan’s WW2
history. Yasukuni appears to be one issue that does not look easily resolvable,
for in Japan it has become a “separation of church and state issue” that no one
wants to touch, and in China it appears to be a non-negotiable. For Beijing the
prime ministerial Yasukuni Shrine visits must stop, though since Koizumi no
Japanese prime minister has visited Yasukuni formally as prime minister as
Koizumi did.
As it regards nationalism and face, both countries could resolve to halt the
“nationalism spiral” in their respective countries, for the extremist nationalists in
both countries are truly a threat to both governments, as well as to international
peace and security. This would not be easy, as Beijing needs a bit of nationalism to
stoke the fires of support for itself, and Japan is a free and open society so the
government is limited in what it can do. China could, however, limit the anti-
Japanism in its state-run media, and the Japanese government could do more to limit
the activities of Japanese hyper-nationalists on disputed islets, and statements of
government officials that rile Japan’s neighbors, for example. With the moves
outlined in the preceding paragraph, both nations could resolve to give each other a
little face and work on some of the outstanding issues such as the disputes over the
islets and water/fishing/resource rights therein.
As it regards the changing strategic factors and growing competition between
Japan and China, there is bad news, however. It would seem that there is little that
can be done about the structural and strategic changes that are taking place. China is
going to rise—there will be no stopping that. North Korea has gone nuclear, it
continues to pose a threat to Japan, and to date US-DPRK talks are not going
smoothly. The Cold War is over and the structural uncertainty that has come with
that change is not likely to dissipate any time soon. In addition, Taiwan seems to be
continuing to change demographically, which likely means it will be yet less
amenable to reunification with a communist China, and the Taiwan issue is not
going to go away short of war or peaceful reunification, despite recent positive
developments between China and Taiwan with the rise of Ma Ying-jeou. All of this
will affect Japan at some level. Lastly, the Japan-US strategic relationship does seem
poised for some major changes (if Japan’s present prime minister can stay in office
for more than a year), possibly including a revised constitution down the road in
Japan which could allow for a regular army and “normal” defense structures there,
all of which will give the Chinese fits.
So, what can be learned from all of this? It would seem that as it regards history,
because it lives in the minds of participants, it can be reinvented, reconstructed,
reinterpreted, and/or at least atoned for, so it can be dealt with effectively and
resolved in this bilateral relationship. While perhaps more difficult to address, with
the political will and requisite conditions face and nationalism too can be dealt with
in this bilateral relationship because they too exist in the minds of the participants
304 G.J. Moore
and are at least somewhat malleable. Both governments can work to curb the
expression of the more dangerous forms of nationalism and violence, and both can
work to ensure that their educational systems more fairly represent the history that
involves the other country. While there can be no denying or deterring the rise of
China, what can be addressed here, however, are the perceptions and/or
interpretations of China’s rise. If China exhibits restraint in its foreign policy
behavior and China and Japan work together on some of these historical, face, and
nationalism issues, they might build greater trust between them and the material rise
of China might come to be viewed in Japan as not quite so threatening. Likewise, in
this case Japan’s participation in the American missile defense program, or even its
eventual rearmament, might not be viewed so much as aimed at China.
Recognizing the sources of Sino-Japanese tension make it possible to address the
sources of Sino-Japanese tension. This in turn can help mitigate against their
evolution into overt conflict. China and Japan h

Результаты (русский) 3:

Бывший премьер-министр Японии Дзюнитиро Коидзуми замечания на церемонии в Токио маркировка 60
годовщины окончания WW2 на 15 Август 2005 г., заслуживают похвалы, почему
не японский премьер-министр говорить одно и то же в Пекине, и возможно, вы посетите
о потерянном мемориал? Со своей стороны, Китай не может согласиться с таким извинения и
заложить вопрос извинения раз и для всех.