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Apartfrom Koizumi's unrelenting visits toYasukuni, on thejapanese sidebilateral "tensions" were represented, and arguably aggravated, through theidentification of China as "a concern" alongside North Korea in the revisedNational Defence Program Guidelines in December 2004, for the first timeever. AJapan-US joint statement in February 2005 was moreover interpretedas if the military alliance encompassed the security of Taiwan—somethingBeijing reacted against with dismay.^ Foreign Minister Asу Tarу also explicitlyreferred to China as "a considerable threat" on several occasions in the mid-2000s.' In addition, public opinion polls showed that the proportion ofJapanese citizens who "does not feel any affinity" {shitashimi o kanjinai) withChina increased by 15.4 percentage points between 2003 and 2005 (from48,0 percent to 63.4 percent)."*As it started to appear likely that Abe Shinzц would succeed Koizumi asJapanese head of government in the summer of 2006, some articles in thepress expressed concern that Abe's credentials as a nationalist and a staunchcritic of China would ensure the prolongation of what had now begun to beviewed as a "Sino-Japanese cold war."^ However, Abe made his first foreigntrip as prime minister to China, and the two governments were unanimousin portraying the visit as an epoch-making success,^ Many observers evencame to regard the emerging bilateral "thaw" as one important exceptionto the policy failures that were otherwise taken to characterize the Abe
administration's one-year stint in power (2006-2007),' During the similarly
short reign of allegedly more "dovish" Prime Minister Fukuda Yasuo (2007-
2008), all talk about "ice-breaking" and "ice-melting" finally led to a
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