Text ‘The Future of War and Peace’T

Text ‘The Future of War and Peace’
The 20th century was the most murderous in recorded history. The total number of deaths caused by or associated with its wars has been estimated at 187m, the equivalent of more than 10% of the world’s population in 1913. Taken as having begun in 1914, it was a century of almost unbroken war, with few and brief periods without organized armed conflict somewhere. It was dominated by world wars: that is to say, by wars between territorial states or alliances of states.
The period from 1914 to 1945 can be regarded as a single “30 years’ war” interrupted only by a pause in the 1920s – between the final withdrawal of the Japanese from the Soviet Far East in 1922 and the attack on Manchuria in 1931. This was followed, almost immediately, by some 40 years of cold war. It is a matter for debate how far the actions in which US armed forces have been involved since the end of the cold war in various parts of the globe constitute a continuation of the era of world war. There can be no doubt, however, that the 1990s were filled with formal and informal military conflict in Europe, Africa and western and central Asia. The world as a whole has not been at peace since 1914, and is not at peace now.
Nevertheless, the century cannot be treated as a single block, either chronologically or geographically. Chronologically, it falls into three periods: the era of world war centered on Germany (1914 to 1945), the era of confrontation between the two superpowers (1945 to 1989), and the era since the end of the classic international power system. Let us call these periods I, II and III. Geographically, the impact of military operations has been highly unequal. With one exception (the Chaco war of 1932-35), there were no significant inter-state wars (as distinct from civil wars) in the western hemisphere (the Americas) in the 20th century. Enemy military operations have barely touched these territories: hence the shock of the bombing of the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon on September 11.
There is now, as there was throughout the 20th century, a complete absence of any effective global authority capable of controlling or settling armed disputes. Globalization has advanced in almost every respect – economically, technologically, culturally, even linguistically – except one: politically and militarily, territorial states remain the only effective authorities. There are officially about 200 states, but in practice only a handful count, of which the US is overwhelmingly the most powerful. However, no state or empire has ever been large, rich or powerful enough to maintain hegemony over the political world, let alone to establish political and military supremacy over the globe. A single superpower cannot compensate for the absence of global authorities, especially given the lack of conventions – relating to international disarmament, for instance, or weapons control – strong enough to be voluntarily accepted as binding by major states. Some such authorities exist, notably the UN, various technical and financial bodies such as the IMF, the World Bank and the WTO, and some international tribunals. But none has any effective power other than that granted to them by agreements between states, or thanks to the backing of powerful states, or voluntarily accepted by states. Regrettable as this may be, it isn’t likely to change in the foreseeable future.
There is, however, a major difference between the 21st and the 20th century. Armed conflicts within states have become more serious and can continue for decades without any serious prospect of victory or settlement: Kashmir, Angola, Sri Lanka, Chechnya, Colombia. In extreme cases, as in parts of Africa, the state may have virtually ceased to exist; or may, as in Colombia, no longer exercise power over part of its territory. Even in strong and stable states, it has been difficult to eliminate small, unofficial armed groups, such as the IRA in Britain and Eta in Spain. The novelty of this situation is indicated by the fact that the most powerful state on the planet, having suffered a terrorist attack, feels obliged to launch a formal operation against a small, international, non-governmental organization or network lacking both a territory and a recognizable army.
How do these changes affect the balance of war and peace in the coming century? I would rather not make predictions about the wars that are likely to take place or their possible outcomes. However, both the structure of armed conflict and the methods of settlement have been changed profoundly by the transformation of the world system of sovereign states.
The dissolution of the Soviet Union means that the Great Power system which governed international relations for almost two centuries and, with obvious exceptions, exercised some control over conflicts between states, no longer exists. Its disappearance has removed a major restraint on inter-state warfare and the armed intervention of states in the affairs of other states – foreign territorial borders were largely uncrossed by armed forces during the cold war. The international system was potentially unstable even then, however, as a result of the multiplication of small, sometimes quite weak states, which were nevertheless officially “sovereign” members of the UN.
These cold war assumptions, both ideological and power-political, will have to be dispensed with if we are to develop some means of controlling armed conflict. It is also evident that the US has failed, and will inevitably fail, to impose a new world order (of any kind) by unilateral force, however much power relations are skewed in its favour at present, and even if it is backed by an (inevitably short-lived) alliance. The international system will remain multilateral and its regulation will depend on the ability of several major units to agree with one another, even though one of these states enjoys military predominance.
The balance of war and peace in the 21st century will depend not on devising more effective mechanisms for negotiation and settlement but on internal stability and the avoidance of military conflict. With a few exceptions, the rivalries and frictions between existing states that led to armed conflict in the past are less likely to do so today. There are, for instance, comparatively few burning disputes between governments about international borders. On the other hand, internal conflicts can easily become violent: the main danger of war lies in the involvement of outside states or military actors in these conflicts.
Yet the world is increasingly divided into states capable of administering their territories and citizens effectively and into a growing number of territories bounded by officially recognized international frontiers, with national governments ranging from the weak and corrupt to the non-existent. These zones produce bloody internal struggles and international conflicts, such as those we have seen in central Africa. There is, however, no immediate prospect for lasting improvement in such regions, and a further weakening of central government in unstable countries, or a further Balkanization of the world map, would undoubtedly increase the dangers of armed conflict.
A tentative forecast: war in the 21st century is not likely to be as murderous as it was in the 20th. But armed violence, creating disproportionate suffering and loss, will remain omnipresent and endemic – occasionally epidemic – in a large part of the world. The prospect of a century of peace is still remote.

Результаты (русский) 1:

Текст «Будущее войны и мира»XX века был самых кровавых в истории. Общее количество смертей вызванных или связанных с его войнами оценивается в 187m, эквивалент более чем 10% населения в мире в 1913 году. Взятые начав в 1914 году, это было столетие почти непрерывной войны, с несколько и краткие периоды без организованного вооруженного конфликта, где-то. Он был доминирует мировых войн: это сказать, войн между территориальной государств или объединений государств.В период с 1914 по 1945 может рассматриваться как единый «30 лет войны» прервана только паузу в 1920 – между окончательного вывода японцев от на Дальнем Востоке СССР в 1922 году и нападения на Маньчжурии в 1931 году. Это последовало, почти сразу же, около 40 лет холодной войны. Это вопрос для обсуждения, насколько действия в которой вооруженные силы США были вовлечены после окончания холодной войны в различных частях земного шара являются продолжением эпохи мировой войны. Там может быть никаких сомнений, однако, что 90-х были заполнены с формальных и неформальных военный конфликт в Европе, Африке и Западной и Центральной Азии. Мир в целом не был в мире с 1914 года и сейчас не в мире.Тем не менее века не может рассматриваться как единый блок, хронологически и географически. Хронологически, он падает на три периода: эра мировой войны сосредоточены на Германии (1914 до 1945), эпохи конфронтации между двумя сверхдержавами (1945-1989) и эра после окончания классические международные системы электропитания. Давайте называть эти периоды I, II и III. Географически воздействия военных операций весьма неравномерно. С одним исключением (чакской войной 1932-35) были не значительные межгосударственных войн (в отличие от гражданских войн) в Западном полушарии (Америка) в XX веке. Вражеские военные операции едва коснулся этих территорий: отсюда шок бомбардировки Всемирный торговый центр и Пентагон 11 сентября.There is now, as there was throughout the 20th century, a complete absence of any effective global authority capable of controlling or settling armed disputes. Globalization has advanced in almost every respect – economically, technologically, culturally, even linguistically – except one: politically and militarily, territorial states remain the only effective authorities. There are officially about 200 states, but in practice only a handful count, of which the US is overwhelmingly the most powerful. However, no state or empire has ever been large, rich or powerful enough to maintain hegemony over the political world, let alone to establish political and military supremacy over the globe. A single superpower cannot compensate for the absence of global authorities, especially given the lack of conventions – relating to international disarmament, for instance, or weapons control – strong enough to be voluntarily accepted as binding by major states. Some such authorities exist, notably the UN, various technical and financial bodies such as the IMF, the World Bank and the WTO, and some international tribunals. But none has any effective power other than that granted to them by agreements between states, or thanks to the backing of powerful states, or voluntarily accepted by states. Regrettable as this may be, it isn’t likely to change in the foreseeable future.There is, however, a major difference between the 21st and the 20th century. Armed conflicts within states have become more serious and can continue for decades without any serious prospect of victory or settlement: Kashmir, Angola, Sri Lanka, Chechnya, Colombia. In extreme cases, as in parts of Africa, the state may have virtually ceased to exist; or may, as in Colombia, no longer exercise power over part of its territory. Even in strong and stable states, it has been difficult to eliminate small, unofficial armed groups, such as the IRA in Britain and Eta in Spain. The novelty of this situation is indicated by the fact that the most powerful state on the planet, having suffered a terrorist attack, feels obliged to launch a formal operation against a small, international, non-governmental organization or network lacking both a territory and a recognizable army.How do these changes affect the balance of war and peace in the coming century? I would rather not make predictions about the wars that are likely to take place or their possible outcomes. However, both the structure of armed conflict and the methods of settlement have been changed profoundly by the transformation of the world system of sovereign states.The dissolution of the Soviet Union means that the Great Power system which governed international relations for almost two centuries and, with obvious exceptions, exercised some control over conflicts between states, no longer exists. Its disappearance has removed a major restraint on inter-state warfare and the armed intervention of states in the affairs of other states – foreign territorial borders were largely uncrossed by armed forces during the cold war. The international system was potentially unstable even then, however, as a result of the multiplication of small, sometimes quite weak states, which were nevertheless officially “sovereign” members of the UN.These cold war assumptions, both ideological and power-political, will have to be dispensed with if we are to develop some means of controlling armed conflict. It is also evident that the US has failed, and will inevitably fail, to impose a new world order (of any kind) by unilateral force, however much power relations are skewed in its favour at present, and even if it is backed by an (inevitably short-lived) alliance. The international system will remain multilateral and its regulation will depend on the ability of several major units to agree with one another, even though one of these states enjoys military predominance.The balance of war and peace in the 21st century will depend not on devising more effective mechanisms for negotiation and settlement but on internal stability and the avoidance of military conflict. With a few exceptions, the rivalries and frictions between existing states that led to armed conflict in the past are less likely to do so today. There are, for instance, comparatively few burning disputes between governments about international borders. On the other hand, internal conflicts can easily become violent: the main danger of war lies in the involvement of outside states or military actors in these conflicts.Yet the world is increasingly divided into states capable of administering their territories and citizens effectively and into a growing number of territories bounded by officially recognized international frontiers, with national governments ranging from the weak and corrupt to the non-existent. These zones produce bloody internal struggles and international conflicts, such as those we have seen in central Africa. There is, however, no immediate prospect for lasting improvement in such regions, and a further weakening of central government in unstable countries, or a further Balkanization of the world map, would undoubtedly increase the dangers of armed conflict.A tentative forecast: war in the 21st century is not likely to be as murderous as it was in the 20th. But armed violence, creating disproportionate suffering and loss, will remain omnipresent and endemic – occasionally epidemic – in a large part of the world. The prospect of a century of peace is still remote.

Результаты (русский) 3:

текст "будущее мира и войны '
хх века была наиболее кровавых в истории человечества.общее число смертей, вызванных или связанных с его войнами оценивается в 187m, эквивалентную более чем 10% мирового населения в 1913 году.как началась в 1914 году, это был век почти непрерывной войныс небольшим и короткие периоды без организованной вооруженного конфликта, где - то.в нем доминировали мировых войн: это означает, что войны между территориальных государств или союзы государств.
период с 1914 по 1945 год можно рассматривать как единую "30 лет" войны ", прерванного пауза в 1920 - е годы – между окончательного вывода японцев из советского дальнего востока в 1922 году и нападении на маньчжурию в 1931 г.за этим последовала почти сразу же, около 40 лет холодной войны.это вопрос для обсуждения, насколько действия, в ходе которых американские вооруженные силы были вовлечены в период после окончания холодной войны в различных частях мира представляют собой продолжение эры мировой войны.не может быть никаких сомнений в том, однако, что в 90 - е годы были наполнены официальных и неофициальных военных конфликтов в европе, африке и западной и центральной азии.